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Notes
DON’T TRY THIS AT HOME: THE FDA’S
RESTRICTIVE REGULATION OF HOMETESTING DEVICES
SHELBY BAIRD†
ABSTRACT
Over the past forty years, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has successfully restricted consumers’ access to home-testing
applications based on the notion that it should protect individuals from
their own reactions to test results. In the 1970s, the FDA briefly denied
women access to home pregnancy tests that were identical to those used
in laboratories. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, it relied on concerns
about consumer responses to HIV status results to justify a categorical
ban on applications for HIV home-testing technology. More recently,
it placed burdensome restrictions on direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic
testing companies, such as 23andMe, based on fears that consumers
would make irrational medical decisions after receiving genetic variant
results.
Although the FDA has the statutory authority to ensure the “safety
and effectiveness” of medical devices, it has expansively interpreted the
term “safety” to encompass considerations of how consumers might
use test results provided by purely informative devices. This Note
argues that courts should not give the FDA deference on its broad
interpretation of “safety” in restricting home-testing devices. It
documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for judicial
deference, noting that courts typically provide scientific agencies,
including the FDA, “super deference” because of the complicated
nature of their work. Ultimately, courts should not defer to the FDA’s
interpretation of “safety” because it did not use its scientific expertise
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when it considered how consumers might react to HIV home-testing
and DTC genetic testing results. Further, the FDA should not have the
authority to make decisions based on its view of “safety” because it
should not have the power to make value judgments for consumers
about whether they should seek their personal medical information.

INTRODUCTION
For most of 2013, American consumers had unprecedented access
to information about their genetics. For ninety-nine dollars, anyone
could purchase 23andMe’s direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic testing
kit, send in a saliva sample, and receive over two hundred
individualized health reports on certain nonmedical traits, such as
ancestry,1 and information on DNA variants linked to higher risks for
diseases, such as type 2 diabetes and Alzheimer’s.2
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) eliminated this access
when it issued a strongly worded Warning Letter to 23andMe on
November 23, 2013.3 The FDA ordered the company to “immediately
discontinue marketing” its testing services until it received marketing
authorization for its health reports, which the FDA characterized as
“medical device uses” requiring premarket approval.4 The FDA
justified this restriction by noting that some of the intended uses for
the kits were “particularly concerning.”5 For instance, it said that
“serious concerns are raised if test results are not adequately
understood by patients.”6 Further, it stated that consumers could
overreact to test results by undergoing unnecessary treatments or could
rely on the information to self-manage their own treatments through
1. Robert Hof, Seven Months After FDA Slapdown, 23andMe Returns with New Health
Report Submission, FORBES (June 20, 2014, 12:04 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/roberthof/
2014/06/20/seven-months-after-fda-slapdown-23andme-returns-with-new-health-reportsubmission/#3af1662277d6 [https://perma.cc/U8NH-EZQC].
2. Robert C. Green & Nita A. Farahany, The FDA Is Overcautious on Consumer
Genomics, 505 NATURE 286, 286 (2014).
3. Letter from Alberto Gutierrez, Dir., Office of In Vitro Diagnostics & Radiological
Health, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Anne Wojcicki,
CEO, 23andMe, Inc. (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/EnforcementActions/
WarningLetters/2013/ucm376296.htm [https://perma.cc/9GRR-8WCT] [hereinafter Warning
Letter to 23andMe].
4. In making this determination, the FDA cited its authority under section 201(h) of the
Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act to require premarket approval for devices “intended for use
in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions or in the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention
of disease,” or “intended to affect the structure or function of the body.” Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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dose changes or the abandonment of certain therapies.7 The FDA also
noted that 23andMe had not assured the agency that it had
“analytically or clinically validated” the tests for their intended uses.8
Demonstration of analytical validity requires the manufacturer to show
that the test accurately detects the presence or absence of a particular
genetic variant, whereas clinical validity requires that the genetic
variant is actually related to the “presence, absence, or risk of a specific
disease.”9 As this Note will discuss, what the FDA required of
23andMe went beyond the definition of clinical validity; instead, the
FDA wanted assurances that consumers could make sound medical
decisions with the information given to them by the test.10 In light of
the concerns for consumer reactions and the tests’ validity, the FDA’s
letter notified 23andMe that it needed to seek premarket approval as
a Class III device,11 which receives the FDA’s highest level of scrutiny.12
After 23andMe spent four years cooperating with the FDA’s
lengthy evaluation process, the FDA only recently approved ten of
23andMe’s health reports for genes linked to disease risk.13 The FDA
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. How Can Consumers Be Sure a Genetic Test Is Valid and Useful?, NIH U.S. NAT’L
LIBRARY MED. (Oct. 3, 2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/validtest [https://perma.cc/
VR6G-MYKF].
10. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment: The FDA & 23andMe Conflict, DUKE SCI. & SOC’Y,
https://scienceandsociety.duke.edu/paternalism-vs-empowerment-the-fda-23andme-conflict
[https://perma.cc/UY2J-ZA8K] [hereinafter Paternalism vs. Empowerment] (arguing that the
FDA wrongly considered consumer reactions as clinical validity concerns); infra Part II.C. An
explanation of the difference as it affects 23andMe states:
[T]he FDA fails to acknowledge a distinction between providing information and
providing opportunities to act upon information. The difference is between the need
for a “device” to be analytically valid and clinically valid (or both). 23andMe provides
genetic information to individuals; any health and medical decisions people make
based on that information are entirely separate from the services directly provided . . .
23andMe clearly advertised its product as being “for informational use only.” It in no
way produces, markets, or distributes a device used by individuals in acting upon their
medical decisions. A concern with the “clinical validity” of genetic information is . . . a
concern with our general understanding of genetics and health. Clinical validity should
be addressed in discussions regarding the technologies individuals use to act on their
genetic information, not in discussing information access.
Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra.
11. Warning Letter to 23andMe, supra note 3.
12. Stephanie P. Fekete, Litigating Medical Device Premarket Classification Decisions for
Small Businesses: Have the Courts Given the FDA Too Much Deference? The Case for Taking the
Focus Off of Efficacy, 65 CATH. U. L. REV. 605, 611–12 (2015).
13. The FDA approved tests for gene variants “associated with an increased risk for
developing . . . the following [ten] diseases or conditions”: Parkinson’s disease, late-onset
Alzheimer’s disease, celiac disease, alpha-1 antitrypsin deficiency, early-onset primary dystonia,
factor XI deficiency, Gaucher disease type 1, glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase deficiency,
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granted the approval after 23andMe submitted several studies to
demonstrate analytical and clinical validity.14 The FDA also announced
that, even though it is creating new criteria for evaluating genetic
health risk (GHR) tests, it will continue to consider “clinical relevance”
in its evaluation and will refuse market authorization for genetic tests
that “function as diagnostic tests” and could be used for treatment
decisions.15 Although the authorization of these ten tests represents a
step forward for improved access to DTC genetic testing, the FDA’s
continued focus on clinical validity, as well as its refusal to approve any
diagnostic tests, indicates that the FDA is still regulating these services
based on its concerns over actions that consumers might take after they
receive test results.
The FDA’s central rationale for regulating DTC genetic testing—
its trepidation about potential reactions to results—is alarming because
the agency is unlawfully restricting consumers’ access to their personal
medical information based on concerns about how individuals might
respond to the very test results that they sought out. The FDA certainly
has the statutory authority to promulgate regulations to ensure the
“safety and effectiveness” of medical devices before they are
marketed,16 but the FDA’s interpretation of safety greatly expands its
power. By interpreting the term “safety” to encompass considerations
of how consumers might use the information to make medical
decisions—which are separate from the device’s purpose of giving an
accurate test result—the FDA affords itself broader discretion to
regulate medical devices.17
The 23andMe story is indicative of a larger trend within the FDA:
the agency has limited consumer access to personal medical
information based on concerns that consumers will have negative
reactions and make poor clinical decisions after receiving test results.

hereditary hemochromatosis, and hereditary thrombophilia. FDA Allows Marketing of First
Direct-to-Consumer Tests That Provide Genetic Risk Information for Certain Conditions, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
PressAnnouncements/ucm551185.htm [https://perma.cc/FA29-E6BV] [hereinafter 23andMe
Approval Announcement].
14. Id. For further discussion of these studies, see infra notes 155–59 and accompanying text.
15. 23andMe Approval Announcement, supra note 13. For further discussion of these
changes, see infra notes 160–66 and accompanying text.
16. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring that the FDA evaluate all medical
devices to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device”).
17. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (explaining that “any health and
medical decisions people make based on that information are entirely separate from the services
directly provided”). For further discussion, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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For example, in 1972, the FDA seized several thousand Ova II home
pregnancy tests, which had only been on the market for one year.18 The
FDA justified this seizure with questions about the product’s reliability
in the hands of laywomen19 even though the test was “‘identical” to
those used by laboratories and “purported to be reasonably accurate”
when used by consumers.20 Then, in 1988, in the midst of the
HIV/AIDS crisis, the FDA refused to consider device approval
applications for home HIV blood-test kits.21 This ban barred
manufacturers from demonstrating that their home-testing kits were
safe and effective.22 The FDA’s decision to limit applications to
diagnostic tests performed in clinical settings has been widely regarded
as a reaction to concerns that individuals would make rash decisions if
they did not receive counseling about their HIV test results.23
These three cases illustrate a recurring theme: when the FDA
evaluates a device that gives consumers greater power to discover
important personal medical information through home-testing, the
agency restricts the device’s use under the guise of public safety and
relies on concerns about potential negative reactions to justify those
restrictions. This Note analyzes whether the FDA’s statutory authority
to ensure the safety of medical devices empowers the FDA to consider
how consumers might use information obtained from an effective and
nonharmful test, which does not make claims about clinical application.
Although there are several different frameworks for analyzing
agencies’ interpretations of their own authority, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence on judicial deference shows that agency expertise is a

18. Richard D. Lyons, Pregnancy Tests Held Unreliable, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 1972),
http://www.nytimes.com/1972/12/13/archives/pregnancy-tests-held-unreliable-doityourselfdetection-kits-are.html [https://perma.cc/Q2ZQ-S5F8].
19. Id. (stating that the FDA seized the tests because it thought they were “inaccurate,
unreliable and prone to give false results”).
20. Joan H. Robinson, Bringing the Pregnancy Test Home from the Hospital, 46 SOC. STUD.
SCI. 649, 657 (2016).
21. Steven R. Salbu, HIV Home Testing and the FDA: The Case for Regulatory Restraint, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 403, 407 (1995).
22. Id. at 452–53.
23. See id. at 453 (arguing that the ban on home-testing device applications “implied that the
FDA’s foremost concern regarding HIV home-testing products was not primary safety and
effectiveness,” but were instead, “considered unacceptable in principle” because of “social
considerations”); Roger Parloff, The Quiet Scandal of the HIV Home Test Kit, FORTUNE (July 9,
2012), http://fortune.com/2012/07/09/the-quiet-scandal-of-the-hiv-home-test-kit [https://perma.
cc/2FRB-6RMH] (explaining that the FDA enacted a ban on applications for HIV home tests
“[o]ut of concern that some people might respond emotionally and irrationally” to the
information provided by the tests).
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central justification for deferring to an interpretation.24 Additionally,
courts typically provide scientific agencies, including the FDA, “super
deference” because of the complicated nature of their work.25
This Note argues that courts should not give the FDA deference
on its expansive interpretation of “safety” in restricting home-testing
applications because the FDA did not use its expertise as a scientific
agency when it considered how consumers might react to HIV hometesting and DTC genetic testing results. Further, this Note argues that,
as a policy matter, the FDA should not have the authority to make
decisions based on this view of “safety” because it should not make
value judgments for consumers about whether they should seek their
own personal medical information. The FDA should not be able to
restrict individual access by effectively deciding that consumers cannot
weigh the potential risks and benefits of seeking these test results,
particularly when consumers can easily find all of the relevant
information for doing so.
Part I explains the history of the FDA’s statutory authority to
regulate medical devices and demonstrates that Congress granted the
FDA the authority to make scientific inquiries into whether devices
directly cause physical harm to consumers. Part II describes three cases
in which the FDA has expanded the meaning of “safety” to restrict
access to devices that provide consumers with personal medical
information. Part III first shows that the FDA’s interpretation of
“safety” is outside the scope of the statutory provision’s clear meaning.
Then, it documents the evolution of the expertise-based rationale for
judicial deference and argues that courts should not defer to the FDA’s
interpretation of “safety” because the FDA did not use its scientific
expertise in the relevant considerations. Finally, this Note argues that,
as a policy matter, the FDA should not have the ability to restrict access

24. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002) (arguing that the
expertise rationale for deference has the strongest justification for judicial deference); Paul
Chaffin, Note, Expertise and Immigration Administration: When Does Chevron Apply to BIA
Interpretations of the INA?, 69 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 503, 525–31 (2014) (providing an
overview of how agency expertise is central to the Supreme Court’s doctrine on judicial deference
to agency statutory interpretation).
25. See Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial
Review as Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011) (explaining that this
view is “encapsulated in the principle that courts ought to be at their ‘most deferential’ when
reviewing an agency’s scientific determinations” (quoting Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983))).
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to devices giving personal medical information based on a paternalistic
view of public safety.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FDA’S AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
MEDICAL DEVICES
This Part provides a brief overview of the legislation granting the
FDA the authority to regulate medical devices. The Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA) initially gave the FDA the
ability to regulate medical devices.26 The passage of the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA) then broadened the FDA’s regulatory
power to include ensuring that medical devices are safe and effective.27
Taken together, the legislative history and language of these statutes
demonstrates that the FDA’s responsibility to ensure medical device
safety is limited to scientific inquiries into whether devices directly
cause physical harm to consumers.28
A. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
Prior to the passage of the FDCA, the FDA did not have
jurisdiction over medical devices.29 Through the FDCA, Congress
expanded the FDA’s authority by giving the agency the ability to
regulate medical devices.30 The FDCA defined “medical device” as “an
instrument, apparatus . . . [or] contrivance . . . including any
component, part, or accessory . . . intended for use in the diagnosis . . . ,
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, in man or other
animals; or intended to affect the structure or any function of the body
of man or other animals.”31 Yet the FDA’s power to regulate these

26. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–392 (2012)).
27. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 513, 90 Stat. 540, 540–46
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c).
28. This Part focuses on these two statutes because, for the purposes of this Note, they
involve the most significant congressional changes to the FDA’s authority over medical devices.
The FDCA was the first statute to give the FDA the authority to regulate medical devices, and
the MDA amended the statute to include considerations of safety and effectiveness—the
operative language analyzed in this Note. See infra Parts I.A and I.B.
29. The Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906 only gave the FDA limited authority to regulate
foods, drugs, and cosmetics. Federal Food and Drugs Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59–384, 34 Stat.
768 (repealed 1938); Peter Barton Hutt, Esq., A History of Government Regulation of
Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99, 100–01 (1989).
30. Id. at 102.
31. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 201(h) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
321(h)).
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devices was limited, as the agency could only take regulatory action
against adulterated or misbranded medical devices after they were
introduced into interstate commerce.32
B. Medical Device Amendments of 1976
Soon after the FDA gained jurisdiction over adulterated or
misbranded devices, a proliferation of fraudulent devices flooded the
market.33 Although the FDA brought successful postmarket actions
against some of these products, keeping up with these devices strained
its resources, and many lawmakers wanted to give the FDA broader
authority to regulate medical devices more effectively.34 Starting in the
1950s, Congress considered several changes to the FDCA that would
expand the FDA’s power to assure the safety and effectiveness of new
medical devices.35
The major motivation for legislation expanding the FDA’s
jurisdiction was the growing public and governmental consensus that
the FDA should protect consumers from physically dangerous and
fraudulent devices.36 For example, President Lyndon B. Johnson
advocated for increased FDA regulatory authority over medical
devices in his February 1967 consumer message.37 To bolster his
argument, President Johnson mainly focused on examples of medical

32. Id. § 304 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 334). A device was deemed to be
“adulterated” if it consisted of a filthy substance, had been prepared in unsanitary conditions, was
composed of “any poisonous or deleterious substance which may render the contents injurious to
health,” or if it differed from the quality stated in its labeling. Id. § 501 (codified as amended at
21 U.S.C. § 351). A device was deemed to be “misbranded” if its “labeling [was] false or
misleading in any particular”; if it did not have a label containing certain information about the
business, quantity of contents, and directions for use and warnings against misuse; or if it was
“dangerous to health” when used according to the label. Id. § 502 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 352).
33. Hutt, supra note 29, at 105.
34. See id. at 104–05 (noting that the FDCA gave the FDA the authority to take “regulatory
action against the adulteration or misbranding of medical devices” and describing the FDA’s
response to the increase in fraudulent devices on the market after the passage of the FDCA).
35. See id. at 105–08 (chronicling congressional and executive efforts to expand the FDA’s
authority).
36. See Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distinguishing
Nonmedical “Devices” from Medical “Devices” Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
806, 820 (1993) (“The Medical Device Amendments of 1976 . . . passed only after many
preventable tragedies outraged the public and Congress.”).
37. Special Message to the Congress To Protect the American Consumer (Feb. 16, 1967), in
1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: LYNDON B. JOHNSON 196, 201
(1968).
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devices that caused direct physical harm to consumers.38 Although the
1967 legislation did not pass, these arguments regarding physical safety
were raised once more during the passage of the MDA. Both the
House and Senate legislative reports also fixated on examples of unsafe
devices that could cause consumers direct, physical harm.39
The legislative reports demonstrate that Congress additionally
wanted to give the FDA the authority to regulate “quack” or
“fraudulent” devices.40 The description of the problems associated with
these devices indicates that Congress wanted to regulate these products
primarily because they were ineffective, rather than physically harmful
and unsafe. For instance, the Senate report described a diagnostic
service “based upon the theory that any ailment [could] be diagnosed
by measuring [emanations] from a dried blood spot on sterile paper,”
when, in fact, an investigation of these claims found that it was
completely ineffective—it was “incapable of distinguishing the blood
of animals or birds from that of man, or that of the living from the
dead.”41 Thus, the issue with these devices was not that they posed a
safety hazard, but rather, were fraudulent because they made false
diagnostic or therapeutic claims. Regulation of such devices now falls
under the FDA’s duty to ensure the “effectiveness” of medical
devices.42

38. In particular, President Johnson cited “[d]efective nails and screws for bone repair [that]
required repeated operations to correct the damage,” “artificial eyes” that caused “serious
infection[s],” and x-ray machines that “emitted excessive doses of radiation.” Id.
39. In the House report, the section entitled “Background and Need for Legislation” pointed
to the following examples as justification for giving the FDA premarket regulatory authority over
certain medical devices: the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, which was highly unsuccessful and
linked to sixteen deaths and twenty-five miscarriages by 1975; “[s]ignificant defects in cardiac
pacemakers [that] have necessitated 34 voluntary recalls of pacemakers, involving 23,000 units,
since 1972”; and intraocular lenses that seriously impaired eleven patients and caused the removal
of the eye of five patients. H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 8 (1976). Further, the House cited the findings
of the Cooper Committee, which was convened by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare in 1969 to evaluate alternatives for FDA device regulation. Id. at 9. The committee found
in its extensive literature review that “10,000 injuries directly related to medical devices over a
ten year period, of which 751 had proved fatal.” Id. The Senate report focused on similar issues
in its section “History of Regulation of Medical Devices and Need for Legislation.” S. REP. NO.
94-33, at 2–7 (1975). For instance, after noting that the need for the legislation was shown “by the
history of several cases against unsafe devices undertaken by the FDA,” the report gave the
example of weight loss devices that “aggravate[d] muscular, gastrointestinal, and other
disorders.” Id. at 6.
40. H.R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 6, 7 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 2–7 (1975).
41. S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 4, 5.
42. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (requiring that the FDA evaluate all medical devices
to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and effectiveness of the device”).
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Another concern motivating the legislation was “congressional
and industry frustration with judicial manipulation of the FDCA
allowing FDA to denominate as drugs many articles that were plainly
devices.”43 Both the House and Senate reports on the MDA cited two
court decisions in which the FDA successfully expanded its jurisdiction
by blurring the line between drugs and devices.44 Accordingly, the
MDA’s impetus was not only to expand the FDA’s jurisdiction over
medical devices, but to also create clearer boundaries for the agency’s
regulatory authority.
The MDA significantly expanded the FDA’s regulatory authority
over medical devices by creating a premarket approval process for new
medical devices.45 The MDA required that the FDA evaluate all
medical devices to “provide reasonable assurance of the safety and
effectiveness of the device,” and then classify them based on the level
of risk that they present to consumers.46 The statute states that for the
purpose of classifying the devices, the “safety and effectiveness of a
device are to be determined—(A) with respect to the persons for
whose use the device is represented or intended, (B) with respect to
the conditions of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the
labeling of the device, and (C) weighing any probable benefit to health

43. Gamerman, supra note 36, at 820–21.
44. H. R. REP. NO. 94-853, at 8–9; S. REP. NO. 94-33, at 6 (pointing to the decisions in Amp,
Inc. v. Gardner, 389 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1968) and United States v. An Article of Drug . . . BactoUnidisk . . . ., 394 U.S. 784 (1969) where courts held, respectively, that a nylon suture and an
antibiotic sensitivity disc were drugs instead of devices). “As a result of these decisions FDA
classified as drugs soft contact lenses, a pregnancy kit, and intrauterine contraceptive devices
which contain drugs or trace metals.” Id.
45. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 2, 90 Stat. 540, 552–59
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360e (2012)).
46. Id. § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c). There are three applicable classes.
Class I devices are considered low risk and are “subject to general controls.” Fekete, supra note
12, at 610. General controls include: “adulterated and misbranded device prevention, registration
of producers of devices . . . , and general provisions respecting control of devices intended for
human use.” Id. at 611. Class II devices are considered moderate risk. They are “subject to special
controls when general controls are not enough ‘to provide reasonable assurance of [the device’s]
safety and effectiveness.’” Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 860.3(c)(2) (2017)). “Special controls include
‘performance standards, postmarket surveillance, patient registries . . . guidelines . . .
recommendations, and other appropriate actions that the [FDA] deems necessary.” Id. Class III
devices are high-risk and “are subject to general controls as well as premarket approval.” Id. The
premarket approval process requires the manufacturer to provide the FDA copious amounts of
information about the device, including “clinical studies and information as to the device’s
efficacy and safety.” Id. at 611–12.
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from the use of the device against any probable risk of injury or illness
from such use.”47
These instructions for device classification suggest two things.
First, the inclusion of this language within the statute indicates that
Congress intended to set boundaries for the FDA’s determination of
the safety and effectiveness of a device, which suggests that Congress
did not want to give the FDA absolute discretion over what constitutes
valid safety and effectiveness considerations. Second, the use of the
language “injury or illness from such use” in section C suggests that
Congress only wanted the FDA to consider a device’s potential for
direct, physical harm when determining safety; “injury or illness”
connotes a tangible, physical impairment and “from such use” implies
that the device directly caused the harm.48
The statute also requires the FDA to use a specific device
classification process: the FDA classifies a device after it receives a
recommendation from a classification panel that has evaluated the
device.49 The panel is comprised of “persons who are qualified by
training and experience to evaluate the safety and effectiveness of the
devices . . . and who, to the extent feasible, possess skill in the use of,
or experience in the development, manufacture, or utilization of, such
devices.”50 Further, the Secretary of Health and Human Services’
appointments to the panels must “consist of members with adequately
diversified expertise in such fields as clinical and administrative
medicine, engineering, biological and physical sciences, and other
related professions.”51 This description suggests that individuals should
have the scientific expertise to evaluate whether the device will
physically harm consumers and if it will be effective in its claims.52
Congress also expanded the medical device definition to include
not only devices that diagnose diseases, but also those that diagnose
“conditions.”53 Further, the MDA requires registration of device

47. Medical Device Amendments § 2(a)(2), 90 Stat. at 541 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(2)) (emphasis added).
48. For further discussion of Congress’s intent to limit safety considerations to a device’s
potential for causing direct, physical harm to consumers, see infra Part III.A.
49. Medical Device Amendments § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(b)(2)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. For a discussion of the FDA’s failure to utilize its scientific expertise in evaluating the
safety of HIV home-testing and DTC genetic testing devices, see infra Part III.B.2.
53. Medical Device Amendments § 2(a)(2). This addition was likely in response to United
States v. OVA II, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976), in which the FDA unsuccessfully argued that it had

BAIRD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

394

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/13/2017 8:33 AM

[Vol. 67:383

establishments,54 authorizes good manufacturing practice regulations,55
and provides the FDA with the authority to ban a device that “presents
substantial deception or an unreasonable and substantial risk of illness
or injury.”56
Although the final law “greatly strengthened the FDA’s authority
to regulate medical devices,” Congress also wrote the MDA with the
purpose of creating regulations that are “carefully tailored to the type
of device involved.”57 Consequently, the classifying scheme and its
reliance on independent advisory panels limited the FDA’s authority
by requiring that it “place all medical devices into one of three
regulatory classes based on the level of regulatory oversight actually
needed to provide reasonable assurances of safety or efficacy.”58
Moreover, several statements made during the House debates
over the MDA suggest that at least some members of Congress were
concerned about the FDA extending its jurisdiction over medical
devices beyond the powers proposed in the legislation.59 In his
comments on the House’s consideration of the conference report on
the Senate’s bill, Representative Paul G. Rogers assured the body that
the legislation was “carefully designed so that the least regulation
necessary to assure safety and effectiveness will be applied to
devices.”60 In a previous House debate over the MDA, Representative
Mark Hannaford stated that although he had “become increasingly

the authority to regulate a home pregnancy test kit as a drug. For a discussion of the OVA II
decision, see infra Part II.A.
54. Medical Device Amendments § 4 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360); see Hutt,
supra note 29, at 113 (describing the major changes instituted by the MDA). Under these
provisions, device manufacturers must register with the FDA, as well as abide by several
administrative provisions regarding registration.
55. Medical Device Amendments § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360j); see Hutt,
supra note 29, at 112–13 (describing the major changes instituted by the MDA).
56. Medical Device Amendments § 2 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360f); see Hutt,
supra note 29, at 112–13 (describing the major changes instituted by the MDA).
57. Hutt, supra note 29, at 113.
58. Gamerman, supra note 36, at 821.
59. See id. at 821–22 (“Congress voiced the fear that FDA, like most agencies, relentlessly
would extend its jurisdiction and power beyond the newly expanded parameters.”).
60. 122 CONG. REC. 13,778 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rogers). In a previous discussion of
the bill, Rep. Rogers made similar comments about Congress’s intent to narrowly tailor the
FDA’s authority:
What we have done is write a bill specific enough so that we just do not turn over to a
bureaucracy and allow them to write whatever and however they want . . . . We have
been specific because we believe the Congress should write the law specifically. The
committee does not intend to allow regulatory agencies to do anything they want to.
Id. at 5851.
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concerned over the phenomenon of law by regulation during [his] term
in Congress . . . . [The MDA bill] is a clear expression . . . permitting
the FDA to implement the law, not write it.”61 Though these
representatives do not speak for Congress as a whole, their statements
indicate that several members of Congress raised the issue of limited
FDA jurisdiction.
Taken together, the legislative history of the MDA demonstrates
that Congress wanted to limit the FDA’s authority to regulate medical
devices according to their safety and effectiveness even as it expanded
the FDA’s jurisdiction over these devices. Further, the statutory
language suggests that considerations of safety and effectiveness
should be limited to scientific inquiries based on the direct, physical
harm that a device might pose to a consumer. Interpreting the statutory
language as permitting the FDA to consider potential indirect,
nonphysical harms undervalues the legislative context of the MDA and
the statutory limitations that Congress placed on the FDA. If Congress
wanted to give the FDA the discretion to consider those types of
harms, it would have passed legislation with broader language that did
not restrict the FDA’s processes for determining the classification,
safety, and effectiveness of devices. Thus, the FDA only has the
statutory authority to consider direct, physical harms to consumers in
determining whether a device is safe.
II. INSTANCES OF FDA PATERNALISM IN EVALUATING THE SAFETY
OF MEDICAL DEVICES
On several occasions over the last forty years, the FDA has
interpreted its statutory authority to regulate the safety and
effectiveness of medical devices to include considerations of how
consumers might react to the information provided by certain hometesting products. The FDA’s attempted seizure of Ova II pregnancy
tests, its ban on HIV home-test approval applications, and its intense
scrutiny of DTC genetic testing demonstrate that the agency has
repeatedly limited access to personal information based on concerns
that are beyond the scope of its authority to consider the safety of new
medical devices under the MDA. This Part provides an overview of the
FDA’s regulatory actions on these three medical devices and analyzes
the agency’s motivations for restricting consumer access to the
information that the devices provide.

61. Id. at 5850 (statement of Rep. Hannaford).
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A. Pregnancy Tests in the 1970s—Ova II
In 1971, Faraday Laboratories began marketing home pregnancy
test kits;62 advertisements in women’s magazines for the tests carried
the slogan, “When you want to be the first to know.”63 The kit was
available without a prescription64 and was “marketed with literature
indicating its use for the purpose of performing, in the home, a
‘preliminary screening test’” for pregnancy.65 It contained “two glass
vials and two bottles of solutions.”66 To complete the test, the user
would mix a urine sample with the two solutions in two separate vials,
combining different numbers of solution drops, in different time
sequences, in each vial.67 Women could tell whether they were
pregnant based on “the presence or absence of distinct visual
differences in the darkness” of the two vials.68 The test was identical to
those used in laboratories and “it purported to be reasonably accurate
in the determination of pregnancy even when used by laypeople.”69
Some heralded the tests as an important advancement in the women’s
health movement, as they gave women greater control over and access
to important medical information.70
Consumer access to the Ova II testing kit was short lived—on
December 12, 1972, the FDA announced that it was recalling the
product because it believed that the kits were “inaccurate, unreliable
and prone to give false results.”71 Although the “reliability or safety”
of the tests were not questioned when they were being used by
laboratories, the FDA thought the kit was “unreliable” in the hands of
laywomen.72
A representative from Faraday countered that the company’s tests
showed that the tests were “accurate and [reliable] when used as
62. Robinson, supra note 20, at 654.
63. Lyons, supra note 18.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Article of Drug . . . Ova II (Ova II), 414 F. Supp. 660, 622 (D.N.J. 1975),
aff’d, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976).
66. Id. at 662–63. The two solutions were hydrochloric acid (HCI) and sodium hydroxide
(NaOH). Id. at 663.
67. Id. at 663.
68. Id. “Distinct differences of color” meant “not pregnant” while “essentially similar color
and saturation indicate[d] pregnancy.” Id.
69. Robinson, supra note 20, at 654.
70. See id. at 658 (noting that some medical professionals expressed their support for home
pregnancy tests “with language of knowledge, information, confidentiality, control, and choices”).
71. Lyons, supra note 18 (quoting the FDA’s statement).
72. Robinson, supra note 20, at 657.
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directed.”73 The company initially agreed to recall the kits, but
questioned the FDA’s authority to recall the product because it was
not a drug.74 At this point, the MDA was not yet in effect and the FDA
only had postmarket regulatory authority over adulterated or
misbranded devices that were related to disease or affected the
structure or function of the body.75
In 1974, Faraday stopped complying with the FDA’s recall76 and
filed suit in federal court in the District of New Jersey against the
FDA.77 The court did not decide whether Ova II was “safe and
effective,” but rather considered whether the FDA had the authority
to regulate the testing kit as a drug under the statutory language.78 The
court granted Faraday’s motion for summary judgment79 because
“[t]he condition of pregnancy . . . is a normal physiological function of
all mammals and cannot be considered a disease of itself.”80 Further,
the judge noted that “no pregnancy test . . . is fully 100% reliable, and
even if they were 100% reliable would disclose no more than that
pregnancy exists or does not exist.”81 Accordingly, all pregnancyrelated ailments or diseases cannot be considered in conjunction with
the pregnancy test kits because those conditions “have other
symptoms” and “must be separately diagnosed.”82
The court in Ova II also clarified some distinctions about the
consideration of medical devices. First, the court signaled that the FDA
cannot hold a manufacturer to an impossible standard of reliability by
noting that “no pregnancy test, including those recognized by FDA as
not only ‘safe and effective’ but also considered by it as the most ‘safe
73. Lyons, supra note 18.
74. Id.
75. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, § 304, 52 Stat. 1040, 1044
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 321(h)). Prior to the MDA, devices were defined as
“instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, including their components, parts, and accessories,
intended (1) for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man
or other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals.” Id. § 201(h). The FDA likely thought that it could successfully characterize the testing
kits as a drug because the Supreme Court had recently ruled that the Bacto-Unidisk, which was a
testing disc for the effectiveness of various antibiotics in treating an infection, was a “drug” under
the FDCA. See United States v. Article of Drug . . . Bacto-Unidisk . . . ., 394 U.S. 784, 785 (1969).
76. Robinson, supra note 20, at 656.
77. Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660 (D.N.J. 1975), aff’d, 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976).
78. Id. at 662.
79. Id. at 667.
80. Id. at 664.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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and effective’ (a quality not required by the Act), is fully 100%
reliable.”83 Given that these kits used the same mechanisms as those
used in laboratory tests, it is unclear why Ova II would have been
dangerous for lay use if “error rates were simply disclosed with the
device.”84 Further, the court correctly narrowed the scope of its inquiry
into Ova II: it would only consider the conditions for which the test is
indicated and not make determinations based on scenarios in which
women might use the pregnancy test result to make decisions about
separate pregnancy-related or other medical issues.85 This distinction is
important because the court likely recognized that many of the FDA’s
concerns over the testing kits were related to issues outside of the scope
of the test’s limited use.
Ultimately, the court’s determination that the FDA could not
impose premarket regulations on Ova II because it did not fit under
the definition of a drug became moot after Congress passed the MDA,
expanding the FDA’s premarket authority to include medical devices
that diagnose “conditions.”86 But the motivations underlying the
FDA’s actions in its attempt to regulate Ova II have not changed. In
this instance, the FDA was likely trying to expand its jurisdiction over
medical devices—which at the time only encompassed adulterated and
misbranded products—because of its concerns for the welfare of
women when using home pregnancy tests. Although there is little
direct evidence about the FDA’s motivations behind its recall of Ova
II,87 the circumstantial evidence outlined above suggests that the FDA
wanted to restrict women’s access to this information and keep these
identical pregnancy tests in the hands of laboratories.
B. HIV Home-Testing
The FDA’s attempts to limit access to information based on the
notion that the agency needed to protect consumers from their own
83. Id.
84. Robinson, supra note 20, at 657.
85. See Ova II, 414 F. Supp. at 664 (“[Pregnancy-related ailments] must be separately
diagnosed. Neither Ova II nor any other pregnancy test attempts to do so. . . . [H]ere, the fact that
there may be ailments or diseases related to pregnancy or associated with it is not an element that
may be considered.”).
86. For a description of the expansion of the device definition under the MDA, see supra
notes 53–61 and accompanying text.
87. The FDA’s website does not contain any information or documents regarding this
seizure. Further, neither the Clerk's Office for the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey nor the National Archives could produce a copy of the Ova II case record. Thus, the
only resources I was able to find regarding this case are those provided in this Section.
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potentially negative reactions did not end with Ova II. During the
HIV/AIDS crisis in the late 1980s, the FDA took a hard stance against
HIV home-testing, in large part because of its concern that consumers
would not be able to handle test results constructively.
Although the FDA was considering premarket approval
applications for home HIV tests in 1986 and 1987,88 it halted this
development in March 1988 and decided to limit applications to blood
collection kits that were “intended for professional use only.”89 The
FDA made this ban official in a guidance published in the Federal
Register in February 1989.90 This move effectively banned
consideration of any applications for HIV home-test kits, as one of the
criteria for applications was that they must be “labeled and marketed
for professional use only within a health care environment (e.g.,
hospitals, medical clinics, doctor’s offices, sexually transmitted disease
clinics, HIV–1 counseling and testing centers, and mental health
clinics[)].”91 Thus, manufacturers of HIV home-testing kits were not
allowed to demonstrate that their products were safe and effective
because the FDA would not consider their applications for premarket
approval.92
Although the FDA had several issues with home HIV tests,93 its
notice for a public meeting on the subject in February 1989 indicates
that it was concerned about consumers’ ability to understand and react
safely to test results. The FDA set up a public forum to discuss its ban
and the two types of home-testing kits: “blood collection kits,” which
instructed consumers to send their blood samples to the testing
company, and “[k]its for [c]ollection and [h]ome [t]esting of [b]lood for
[e]vidence of HIV–1 [i]nfection,” which allowed consumers to test
their own specimens.94 Regarding blood collection kits, the FDA noted

88. Salbu, supra note 21, at 407.
89. Blood Collection Kits Labeled for Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 (HIV-1)
Antibody Testing; Home Kits Designed to Detect HIV-1 Antibody; Open Meeting, 54 Fed. Reg.
7279, 7280 (Feb. 17, 1989) [hereinafter HIV Testing Meeting].
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Salbu, supra note 21, at 452–53.
93. The FDA made arguments for banning home HIV tests other than its concerns about
consumer reactions. For instance, one FDA spokesperson explained that “refusal to consider
applications of HIV home tests was based on several concerns, including the potentially improper
drawing of blood samples, the possibility of blood samples being held for long periods of time,
and the potential for blood samples to be affected by temperature changes during in-mail transit.”
Salbu, supra note 21, at 407.
94. HIV Testing Meeting, supra note 89, at 7280–81.
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that medical experts believed that HIV testing should include
counseling for test results and solicited comments “regarding the
ability to provide effective pre- and post-test counseling in a setting
outside the health care environment.”95 For combination collection and
testing kits, the FDA invited comments as to “whether laypersons can
adequately interpret the test results, and whether that interpretation in
the absence of a medical professional is appropriate.”96 Although the
FDA listed other issues for the public meeting,97 its concern for
laypersons’ ability to understand and respond to their own results
without professional oversight suggests that its ban on HIV hometest
applications was informed, at least in part, by the view that consumers
needed to be protected from receiving this information outside of a
clinical setting.
Testimony from the FDA’s open meeting on this issue also
demonstrates that the agency relied on concerns about consumer
reactions instead of scientific data about the safety and effectiveness of
HIV home-testing kits. The FDA revealed that at least seventeen
companies indicated that they were interested in marketing HIV
home-testing kits, which would require individuals to send blood or
saliva samples for testing.98 The FDA acknowledged the existence of
technology that allowed a person to do the entire test at home even
though no company had yet developed the test.99 The expert opinions
presented at the meeting were mixed.100 The Vice President of the
Hudson Institute—a public policy think tank that conducted some
HIV/AIDS research101—urged the FDA to consider the home tests

95. Id. at 7281.
96. Id.
97. For blood collection kits, the FDA also asked for comments on the “[c]ollection and
shipping of blood samples by laypersons,” the “[r]eturn of test results directly to the person from
whom the sample was collected,” and the “[a]vailability of blood collection systems.” Id. at 7280–
81. For combination collecting and testing kits, the agency asked for comments on “whether the
kits should be made available OTC, [and] whether laypersons can reliably and safely perform the
test.” Id. at 7281.
98. Rebecca Kolberg, A Public Policy Expert Charged Thursday Government Inaction
on . . ., UNITED PRESS INT’L (Apr. 6, 1989), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1989/04/06/A-publicpolicy-expert-charged-Thursday-government-inaction-on/3140607838400
[https://perma.cc/
26DR-UNVU].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Philip M. Boffey, Research Group Says AIDS Cases May Be Twice the U.S. Estimate,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/08/20/us/research-group-says-aidscases-may-be-twice-the-us-estimate.html [https://perma.cc/XBT9-XVX7] (discussing the Hudson
Institute’s research). In fact, in 1988, the Hudson Institute estimated that President Reagan’s
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immediately, arguing that “[t]o continue to prohibit it (home AIDS
testing) is to condemn some Americans to death as [a] result of
inadvertent transmission of HIV.”102 On the other hand, a
representative from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) argued
that the tests could cause “all types of heartache,” as “people who test
positive or even falsely positive for HIV may react in hysterical or
irrational ways, such as committing suicide, while those who test falsely
negative may wrongly consider themselves ‘resistant’ to the deadly
virus and continue high-risk behaviors.”103 The Deputy Director of the
federal Center for Disease Controls’ AIDS program expressed concern
about the effectiveness of the companies’ telephone counseling.104
Despite the Hudson Institute’s urging for greater access to this
technology, the FDA did not relax its guidelines for HIV-testing
applications until several years later.105 Although the testimony from
opponents of home-testing did not represent the FDA’s official
position, the focus on shielding consumers from important medical
information and the FDA’s refusal to reconsider its restrictions suggest
that these concerns prevailed over considerations of the device’s
scientific, analytical validity.106 There is also evidence that the FDA was
pressured by a powerful political coalition—including groups such as
the American Medical Association and the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, several members of Congress, and gay rights
activists—that opposed home-testing applications because “they might
be inaccurate or increase the risk of suicide.”107 The FDA’s decision to
take a strong, prophylactic measure against this technology by refusing

AIDS commission was underestimating the total number of Americans infected with AIDS, as
well as the number of infected heterosexuals. Id.
102. Kolberg, supra note 98.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Home Specimen Collection Kit Systems Intended for Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV-1 and/or HIV-2) Antibody Testing; Revisions to Previous Guidance, 60 Fed. Reg. 10,087
(Feb. 23, 1995) [hereinafter Revisions to Previous Guidance].
106. This Note does not analyze whether the FDA’s assumption that HIV test results have a
high likelihood of eliciting negative reactions was correct, but rather demonstrates that the FDA
relied on this consideration when it banned HIV home-testing applications. Further, this Note
argues in Part III.B.2 that restricting access to this information interferes with the consumer’s
autonomy to weigh the potential risks and benefits of seeking personal health information like
HIV status—regardless of potential reactions.
107. Alexi A. Wright & Ingrid T. Katz, Home Testing for HIV, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 437,
438 (2006). It appears that the fear of harmful reactions was prevalent in these arguments, as
“AIDS activists reinforced the latter point by distributing copies of the obituary of a man who
had jumped off the Golden Gate Bridge after learning that he was HIV-positive.” Id.
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to consider premarket applications for these devices makes it apparent
that the FDA gave substantial weight to the notion that it needed to
protect consumers from their own medical information.108 In fact, the
FDA openly acknowledged its concerns throughout the public
comment process, and the director of the FDA’s Center for Biologics
Evaluation and Research admitted during the public meeting that the
agency “took a conservative view” of its considerations of HIV hometesting kits.109
In April of 1990, the FDA hinted that it might begin considering
applications for home-testing kits, but then reaffirmed the 1989
guidance limiting applications to tests for “professional use.”110 In 1994,
three companies that had previously sought premarket approval for
home tests sent new applications to the FDA, requesting that the
agency reconsider the ban.111 The FDA convened an advisory panel to
consider the issue “[i]n light of scientific and technological
developments and the changing nature of the HIV epidemic.”112 This
time, the majority of the advisory committee members “believed that
the potential benefits of over-the-counter (OTC) home specimen
collection kits outweighed the potential risks.”113 Afterward, the FDA
issued a guidance in February 1995 that lifted the ban on applications
for home-specimen-collection testing kits.114 Although the ban reversal
was a victory for device manufacturers, the FDA still placed several
burdensome guidelines on the approval of these devices. For instance,
applications had to show that test results would be given to consumers
by “persons appropriately trained in HIV notification and counseling”
and that consumers with positive results would receive counseling that
referred them to “medical and social support services” in their
community.115
Although the FDA cited “scientific and technological
developments and the changing nature of the HIV epidemic” as

108. For a discussion of the specific provisions of the FDA’s ban on HIV home-test
applications, see supra notes 89–91 and accompanying text.
109. Kolberg, supra note 98.
110. Blood Collection Kits Labeled for Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV-1) Antibody
Testing; Availability of Letter for Interested Persons, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,982, 30,982 (July 30, 1990).
111. Salbu, supra note 21, at 411.
112. Revisions to Previous Guidance, supra note 105, at 10,087.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10,088
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reasons for reconsidering its ban on specimen-collection kits,116 few
developments had occurred during the previous five years.117 The
importance of diagnostic tools in the fight against HIV had not
changed—the scientific community knew when the ban was imposed
that “avoidance of new infection [was] the only method” available for
curbing the number of HIV-related deaths.118 Additionally, although
the companies interested in marketing this product continued to
develop HIV-testing technology during the ban, they were repeatedly
denied the ability to show that the tests were safe and effective.119 In
fact, the former president of a company that sought approval for an
HIV home-testing kit testified that when his company presented their
product for final approval in 1994, they used “essentially the same
data” they took to the FDA in 1987—the year they first applied for
premarket approval.120
Thus, the FDA’s blanket ban on both types of home-testing
products from 1988 to 1994 was not primarily based on scientific data
on the safety and effectiveness of these devices.121 Rather, the products
were “considered unacceptable in principle” because the FDA was
concerned about the potential ramifications of consumers having
access to this information.122 The application process could have given
companies—who had the technology for home-testing kits years before
applications were accepted—the chance to show that concerns about
consumer reactions were not supported by scientific studies.123 Instead,
the manufacturers were denied this opportunity until the FDA decided
that it would consider their data for approval. In fact, the FDA did not
lift its ban on applications for combination home collection and testing
kits (or “rapid home” tests) until seventeen years later in 2005.124
Although at least one company submitted an application for approval

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 10,087.
Salbu, supra note 21, at 452.
Id.
Id. at 452–53.
FDA BLOOD PRODS. ADVISORY COMM., TESTIMONY OF ELLIOTT J. MILLENSON,
FORMER PRESIDENT & CEO, J&J/DIRECT ACCESS DIAGNOSTICS (2006), http://www.fda.gov/
ohrms/dockets/ac/06/slides/2006-4206OPH2_2b.htm [https://perma.cc/SLE2-L6NB].
121. Salbu, supra note 21, at 453.
122. Id.
123. See Parloff, supra note 23 (suggesting that the FDA could have allowed research to
determine if the “apprehensions surrounding home testing were empirically justified”).
124. Id.
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of a rapid home test in 1987, the FDA did not approve the first rapid
home HIV test until twenty-five years later in 2012.125
C. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing
Around the same time that the FDA loosened restrictions on HIV
rapid tests, it began to increase its enforcement efforts against another
form of medical information: DTC genetic tests. Companies started to
offer DTC genetic testing services in 2007.126 In May 2010, the FDA
started regulating these devices.127 After Pathway Genomics
announced that it was partnering with Walgreens to sell its hometesting kit in over 6,000 stores throughout the United States,128 the
FDA sent the company an Untitled Letter.129 In the letter, the FDA
noted that the company’s kit “intended to report customary and
personal genetic health disposition results for more than 70 health
conditions” for the purpose of creating a “health regime to live a
healthier, longer life.”130 Further, the FDA noted that the kit
“appear[ed] to meet the definition of a device” under the FDCA, but
the company did not have preclearance or approval for it.131 As a result,
Walgreens eventually cancelled the plan, and Pathway returned to
selling the test online, but only giving results to physicians.132
The FDA then ramped up its surveillance of DTC genetic testing
companies. A month after the Pathway letter, the FDA sent Untitled
Letters to five additional companies, following the same line of

125. Id.
126. Green & Farahany, supra note 2, at 286.
127. Kayte Spector-Bagdady & Elizabeth Pike, Consuming Genomics: Regulation Direct-toConsumer Genetic and Genomic Information, 92 NEB. L. REV. 677, 705 (2014).
128. Id.
129. The FDA uses two types of letters to notify companies of violations: Warning and
Untitled Letters. Warning Letters alert the company of “violations that may lead to enforcement
action.” Id. at 704. Untitled Letters are used for “less significant violations.” Id.
130. Letter from James Woods, Deputy Dir. of Patient Safety & Product Quality, Office of In
Vitro Diagnostic Device Evaluation & Safety, Ctr. for Devices & Radiological Health, U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., to James Plante, Founder & CEO, Pathway Genomics Corp. (May 10, 2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/UCM211875.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X5BG-PWRP]. Pathway Genomics’ health claims do not affect this Note’s
subsequent analysis of the FDA’s authority to regulate these types of tests based on concerns
about consumer reactions. The decisions that consumers make in response to the tests—including
those regarding their “health regime”—are secondary to the device’s purpose to provide
information. For a discussion of how consumer reactions are separate from the device’s purpose,
see infra notes 245–49 and accompanying text.
131. Id.
132. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 127, at 706.
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reasoning.133 In July of 2010, Jeffrey Shuren, the Director of the FDA’s
Center for Device and Radiological Health provided congressional
testimony about the agency’s decision to intervene in DTC genetic
testing.134 His testimony indicates that the FDA had several concerns
about consumers receiving this type of information: “Marketing
genetic tests directly to consumers can increase the risk of a test
because a patient may make a decision that adversely affects their
health, such as stopping or changing the dose of a medication or
continuing an unhealthy lifestyle, without the intervention of a learned
intermediary.”135 Shuren also noted that the six DTC companies that
the FDA contacted had not “submitted information on the analytical
or clinical validity of their tests to FDA for clearance or approval.”136
These statements show the FDA’s initial regulation of DTC genetic
testing was motivated in part by concerns about its clinical validity.137
The FDA “sent similar letters to 15 other firms marketing DTC genetic
tests” in July 2010138 and three final Untitled Letters in May 2011.139
In March 2011, the FDA convened a meeting of the Molecular and
Clinical Genetics Panel to “discuss and make recommendations on
scientific issues concerning direct to consumer (DTC) genetic tests that
make medical claims.”140 It seems that the panel was concerned with
guarding the public from what it considered potentially harmful
information, as the participants considered the benefits and risks of
making these services available without physician supervision. The
report noted that the panelists had different opinions as to whether the
“risks outweigh the benefits of offering this category of tests DTC.”141
Further, the participants “generally agreed” that they should

133. Id.
134. Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing & the Consequences to the Public Health: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce,
111th Cong. 79 (2010) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren, M.D., Dir., Ctr. for Devices & Radiological
Health, Food & Drug Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. For an explanation of the FDA's expansive definition of clinical validity in the 23andMe
context, see supra note 10 and accompanying text.
138. Id.
139. Spector-Bagdady & Pike, supra note 127, at 710.
140. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., SUMMARY OF THE MOLECULAR & CLINICAL
GENETICS PANEL MEETING (Mar. 8–9, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Advisory
Committees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/MedicalDevices/MedicalDevicesAdvisoryCommitte
e/MolecularandClinicalGeneticsPanel/UCM246907.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5CG-MZUX].
141. Id.
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recommend that certain types of genetic tests only be offered upon
prescription.142 In considering potential “mitigations against incorrect,
misinterpreted, miscommunicated, or misunderstood test results” for
tests offered without live counseling sessions, panel members had the
following suggestions: first, providing patient training and education;
second, utilizing a “knowledge test prior to providing the DTC clinical
genetic test to assess whether the consumer understands the meaning
or consequences of test results”; and third, requiring that companies
provide “qualified genetic counselors” to consumers.143 These
considerations by the panel confirm that the FDA premised a
substantial part of its concern over DTC genetic testing on its notion
that it had a duty to protect consumers from receiving this information
on their own, lest consumers react negatively without professional
help.
Although 23andMe was going through the process of gaining
premarket clearance for its health-related tests in 2012, the FDA sent
a strongly worded Warning Letter to the company in November 2013,
effectively withdrawing its applications.144 The FDA ordered the
company to “immediately discontinue marketing” the services and
seek premarket approval as a Class III device.145 The 23andMe
Warning Letter used concerns about consumer reactions to test results
to rationalize the regulation, rather than legitimate safety
considerations about direct, physical harm.146 The FDA found that
some of the kits’ uses were “particularly concerning,” and cited the
possibility that consumers could use their testing results to self-manage
their medical conditions or discontinue therapies, as well as overreact
and undergo radical, unnecessary treatments.147 The FDA also noted
that 23andMe needed to provide assurance that it had “analytically”

142. The report said that the following categories should be prescription only: “presymptomatic tests with high predictor for a disease, with potentially severe consequences, and
pharmacogenetic tests.” Id.
143. Id.
144. Warning Letter to 23andMe, supra note 3.
145. Id.
146. For a discussion of the FDA’s concerns outlined in the 23andMe Warning Letter, see
supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text.
147. Warning Letter to 23andMe, supra note 3. The Warning Letter explained that “patients
relying on such tests may begin to self-manage their treatments through dose changes or even
abandon certain therapies . . . .” Further, it noted that consumers who receive a false positive
result for the gene for breast or ovarian cancer could “undergo prophylactic surgery,
chemoprevention, intensive screening, or other morbidity-inducing actions.” Id.
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and “clinically validated” the tests for their intended uses.148 The
FDA’s persistent reliance on consumer responses as a rationale for
regulating DTC genetic testing devices demonstrates that it includes
these considerations in its evaluation of clinical validity.
Despite the FDA’s approval of some DTC genetic tests, it
continues to impose severe restrictions on consumers’ access to their
genetic information based on concerns about consumer reactions to
results. In 2015, approximately eighteen months after the 23andMe
Warning Letter, the FDA approved the company’s carrier test for
Bloom syndrome.149 The process for seeking this approval was quite
burdensome. In addition to studies focused on ensuring analytical
validity, 23andMe performed two studies demonstrating clinical
validity: one “usability study,” which indicated that “consumers could
understand the test instructions and collect an adequate saliva sample,”
and one user study “to show the test instructions and results were easy
to follow and understand” for a diverse set of participants.150
The FDA also announced that it was classifying DTC carrier
screening tests as Class II devices, which do not require premarket
review.151 23andMe received approval for thirty-six carrier tests,
including cystic fibrosis, later that year.152 The FDA likely granted
carrier screenings a regulatory carve out because it believed that
consumers are unlikely to react negatively to results; carrier screenings
do not implicate “the acute anxiety of personal disease risk” because
the primary concern is whether the person might pass along the gene
to children.153

148. Id. For an explanation of analytical and clinical validity, see supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
149. FDA Permits Marking of First Direct-To-Consumer Genetic Carrier Test for Bloom
Syndrome, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm435003.htm [https://perma.cc/6JCA-VWT3]. “Individuals
born with Bloom Syndrome experience stunted growth, rarely reaching five feet in height and are
very light-sensitive and predisposed to cancer such that life expectancy is in the 20s.” David Kroll,
FDA Approves 23andMe Gene Carrier Test, FORBES (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/davidkroll/2015/02/19/fda-okays-23andmes-direct-to-consumer-gene-carrier-testingstarting-with-bloom-syndrome/#152661d83791 [https://perma.cc/9J3C-AC38].
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Erika Check Hayden, Out of Regulatory Limbo, 23andMe Resumes Some Health Tests
and Hopes to Offer More, NATURE (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.nature.com/news/out-ofregulatory-limbo-23andme-resumes-some-health-tests-and-hopes-to-offer-more-1.18641
[https://perma.cc/8P5T-DVX3].
153. Kroll, supra note 149.
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On April 6, 2017, the FDA announced that after nearly four years
of consideration, it approved ten of 23andMe’s genetic tests for
diseases or conditions.154 The agency acknowledged that these tests are
the first DTC genetic tests approved by the FDA that “provide
information on an individual’s genetic predisposition to certain
medical diseases or conditions, which may help to make decisions
about lifestyle choices or to inform discussions with a health care
professional.”155 Further, the FDA noted that it reviewed data for the
tests through the de novo premarket review pathway, which it
described as “a regulatory pathway for novel, low-to-moderate-risk
devices that are not substantially equivalent to an already legally
marketed device.”156
Although this announcement seems like a significant
accomplishment for 23andMe, the FDA’s consideration of the clinical
validity of these tests demonstrates that the agency is still regulating
DTC genetic tests in light of concerns about potential consumer actions
taken in response to test results. The FDA noted that 23andMe’s tests
were only approved after the company demonstrated their analytical
and clinical validity.157 In regards to clinical validity, the FDA required
that “the results of all DTC tests used for medical purposes be
communicated in a way that consumers can understand and use.”158
Although the FDA stated that the genetic information might help
consumers make “lifestyle choices,” it also noted that results “should
not be used for diagnosis or to inform treatment decisions.”159
Further, the FDA indicated in the approval announcement that it
is reconsidering its evaluation process for genetic health risk (GHR)
tests. The FDA noted that it is “establishing criteria, called special
controls, which clarify the agency’s expectations in assuring the tests’
accuracy, reliability and clinical relevance.”160 These special controls
would supplement general controls required by FDA regulations, and
would “provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness for
these and similar GHR tests.”161 The FDA also vaguely alluded to
154. 23andMe Approval Announcement, supra note 13.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. Accordingly, 23andMe conducted a user study showing that “people using the tests
understood more than 90 percent of the information presented in the reports.” Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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making the approval process easier in the future: the agency noted that
it “intend[ed] to exempt additional 23andMe GHR tests from the
FDA’s premarket review, and GHR tests from other makers may be
exempt after submitting their first premarket notification.”162 Although
the FDA did not give any further details on this potential exemption,
it appears that this regulatory pathway would only apply to tests that
have already been analytically and clinically verified, as the FDA also
stated that the proposed exemption would “allow other, similar tests to
enter the market as quickly as possible and in the least burdensome
way, after a one-time FDA review.”163
Although the approval announcements for the carrier genes and
GHR tests seem like victories for consumer access to DTC genetic
testing, they do not signify a major shift in the FDA’s regulatory
approach for these devices because the agency has demonstrated that
it is still concerned about the clinical decisions that consumers might
make after receiving genetic test results. In fact, the FDA noted in the
GHR tests announcement that the newly proposed “special controls”
for assuring safety and effectiveness will include agency expectations
for “clinical relevance.”164 This appears to encompass the same
considerations as the FDA’s expansive formulation of clinical validity
for DTC genetic testing—which includes considerations of consumer
responses to test results—because “relevance” connotes test result
usage for clinical decisionmaking.
The FDA also stated in the GHR tests announcement that the
recent authorization and “any future, related exemption” for GHR
tests excluded “tests that function as diagnostic tests.”165 The FDA
explained that these tests are “often used as the sole basis for major
treatment decisions, such as a genetic test for BRCA, for which a
positive result may lead to prophylactic (preventative) surgical
removal of breasts or ovaries.”166 Unsurprisingly then, along with the
thirty-six carrier tests authorized in 2015, the FDA has only approved
ten out of the company’s original 240 health condition tests after nearly
four years of FDA consideration.167 Thus, despite its recent
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Amy Maxmen, 23andMe Given Green Light To Sell DNA Tests for 10 Diseases,
NATURE (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.nature.com/news/23andme-given-green-light-to-sell-dnatests-for-10-diseases-1.21802 [https://perma.cc/UFE9-J7UB].
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authorizations for ten disease risk tests, the FDA’s approval process
and exclusion of genetic tests that could provide consumers important
medical information indicates that it is still concerned about how
consumers will use test results.
The current approval regime for DTC genetic testing reflects the
continuation of the FDA’s expansive interpretation of its duty to
ensure the safety of devices under the MDA. The FDA’s swift, strict
regulation of DTC genetic testing and its characterizations of these
services indicate that it has broadened its inquiries into these devices
to include concerns about what consumers will do with results. The
FDA appears to fear that consumers are not only unable to understand
genetic testing results, but are also at risk of drastically changing their
physician-guided treatment plans or undergoing unnecessary and
dangerous procedures.
Regulatory restrictions that require DTC genetic testing
companies to demonstrate the FDA’s broad definition of clinical
validity go beyond the scope of Congress’s intent to limit the FDA’s
consideration of “safety” to the relevant scientific evidence of whether
a device might cause physical harm.168 Certainly, the FDA may
consider the tests’ accuracy in detecting genetic traits, but this inquiry
does not encompass considerations of how consumers will react to
certain results.169 Accordingly, the FDA’s rationale for setting
burdensome restrictions on DTC genetic testing services is identical to
its motivations for the seizure of the Ova II pregnancy tests and the
ban on HIV home-testing kit applications—in all three instances, the
FDA restricted individual access to personal medical information
based on concerns about how people would respond to such
information.
III. CONSIDERATIONS OF CONSUMER REACTIONS ARE OUTSIDE
THE SCOPE OF THE FDA’S STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND
EXPERTISE
The FDA’s actions regarding the Ova II pregnancy tests, HIV
home-testing kits, and DTC genetic testing kits demonstrate that the
FDA has repeatedly justified restrictions on access to personal medical
information out of concern for how consumers might react to such

168. For a discussion of the FDA’s statutory authority to consider the “safety” of medical
devices under the MDA, see infra Part III.A.
169. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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knowledge. Because the FDA was not constrained by the language of
“safety and effectiveness” under the MDA when it recalled the Ova II
pregnancy tests, this Part focuses on and analyzes the FDA’s
restrictions on HIV home-testing kits and DTC genetic testing.
The FDA’s consideration of the actions consumers might take
after receiving test results greatly expands its authority to evaluate the
safety of medical devices. This expansion is untenable for two reasons.
First, the FDA lacks the authority to consider these types of potential
harms because the meaning of “safety” in the MDA is clear—it only
includes considerations of scientific evidence that the device directly
causes physical harm to consumers.170 Second, the courts should not
defer to the FDA’s broad interpretation of “safety,” which includes
potential nondirect, nonphysical harms. The FDA is not entitled to
deference in these cases because it did not use its expertise when it took
regulatory action; even though the FDA is a scientific agency, its safety
concerns for these devices were not supported by scientific inquiries.
Further, as a policy matter, the FDA should not have the power to
make value judgments for consumers about whether they can handle
receiving information about their own bodies.
A. The Term “Safety” Is Limited to Scientific Inquiries into the
Potential for Direct, Physical Harm to Consumers
Whether a statutory provision has a clear meaning can be part of
a court’s deference analysis.171 The statutory language, structure of the
MDA, and legislative history demonstrate that the meaning of “safety”
is clear—Congress intended to limit the FDA’s consideration of safety
to scientific inquiries about a device’s potential to cause direct physical
harm to consumers.172
First, Congress’s inclusion of instructions for determining safety
and effectiveness indicates that it intended to limit the FDA’s
discretion in considering these two requirements for medical devices.173

170. For a discussion of how the legislative history and language of the MDA demonstrates
Congress’s intent to limit the FDA’s safety considerations, see supra Part I.B.
171. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). Under
the first step of the Chevron test, the court determines “whether Congress has directly spoken to
the precise question at issue.” If congressional intent is clear, the agency must follow this
expressed intent. Id.
172. For a discussion of the language, structure, and legislative history of the MDA, see supra
Part I.B.
173. For a discussion of the MDA’s instructions for determining safety and effectiveness, see
supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.

BAIRD IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

412

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

11/13/2017 8:33 AM

[Vol. 67:383

The language “risk of injury or illness from use” further suggests that
Congress only wanted the FDA to investigate devices’ potential for
directly causing physical harm in its safety determinations.174 Second,
the MDA’s structural limitations for the FDA’s consideration of
“safety and effectiveness” demonstrate that the agency is limited to
conducting scientific inquiries; the agency must consider
recommendations from classification panels which, the statute
suggests, are comprised of individuals who have the scientific expertise
to evaluate the “safety and effectiveness” of devices.175
Finally, the historical record shows that the then-growing need for
FDA regulation of physically dangerous and fraudulent products
motivated Congress to expand the FDA’s jurisdiction to include an
investigation into the “safety and effectiveness” of medical devices.176
Both the House and Senate reports on the bill extensively cited unsafe
devices that directly caused physical harm to consumers.177 The
descriptions within these reports indicate that the “safety” prong of the
FDA’s mandate was meant to give the agency the authority to protect
consumers from these dangers. Further, the “effectiveness” prong was
intended to help the FDA weed out fraudulent or quack devices
making false diagnostic or therapeutic promises.178 Additionally,
Congress’s concern over the FDA’s attempts to expand its jurisdiction
over devices, highlighted in both legislative reports, suggests that
Congress wanted to create boundaries for the agency’s regulatory
authority.179 In fact, two members of Congress echoed this concern and
praised the MDA because it sufficiently tailored the FDA’s jurisdiction
over devices.180 Although these statements cannot definitively speak
for Congress’s intent, they suggest that Congress considered the issue
of limiting the FDA’s authority.

174. For a discussion of the statutory provision that sets standards for the FDA’s
determination of safety and effectiveness, see supra note 47 and accompanying text.
175. For a discussion of this statutory provisions regarding requirements for classification
panels, see supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
176. For a discussion of the political impetuses for the MDA, see supra notes 36–39 and
accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of the House and Senate reports, see supra note 39 and accompanying
text.
178. For a discussion of Congress wanting to give the FDA authority to regulate fraudulent
devices, see supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.
179. For a discussion of the congressional concerns about the FDA’s attempts to expand its
jurisdiction, see supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
180. For a discussion of these statements made in favor of limiting the FDA’s jurisdiction
during the passage of the MDA, see supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
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Taken together, these aspects of the language and passage of the
MDA indicate that Congress wanted to limit the FDA’s authority to
determine a device’s safety to scientific inquiries into a device’s
potential to directly cause physical harm to consumers. Thus, the FDA
does not have the authority to consider or evaluate nonscientific
concerns about nonphysical harms that do not directly result from the
utilization of a device.
Despite this statutory limitation, these considerations guided the
FDA’s decisions to ban HIV-testing-kit device applications and restrict
DTC genetic testing. In both instances, the FDA considered whether
consumers would react negatively to the test results and subsequently
make poor medical or life decisions.181 Using these concerns to
determine the safety of a device is impermissible because negative
reactions do not constitute direct physical harm. Furthermore, any
actions that a consumer takes after learning this information are
completely separate from the test results and, accordingly, do not
relate directly to the device.182 The tests have served their purpose once
the consumer receives the test results;183 the HIV-testing kits and DTC
genetic tests do not provide clinical claims about what consumers
should or should not do with the information.
Some might argue that the FDA has the authority to consider
negative reactions because the information could cause some
consumers psychological distress, which could lead to physical harm.
Although such a reaction might be related to the results, this argument
improperly combines the device’s purpose—to give information and
nothing more—with the consumer’s own decisions about how to
respond.184 Further, allowing the FDA to consider how test results
might affect consumers effectively shifts the regulatory focus away
from the safety of the device itself to allowing the FDA to act as a

181. For a discussion of the FDA’s regulatory actions against HIV home-testing kits and DTC
genetic testing services premised on concerns about consumer reactions to test results, see supra
Parts II.B and II.C.
182. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (noting that “23andMe provides genetic
information to individuals; any health and medical decisions people make based on that
information are entirely separate from the services directly provided, and most (if not all)
significant clinical decisions made on behalf of such information must be made utilizing additional
technologies under physician consultation” and that “[i]nformation is information, and nothing
more”).
183. See id.
184. See id.
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gatekeeper for disseminating personal information.185 Accordingly, the
FDA exceeded its statutory authority when it considered these
potential reactions in determining the safety of the HIV-testing kits
and DTC genetic testing services.
B. The FDA’s Interpretation Is Not Entitled to Deference Because the
Agency Did Not Use and Should Not Have the Relevant Expertise
To Make These Considerations
Even if the meaning of “safety” were ambiguous, the courts should
not defer to the FDA’s broad interpretation of this term. While courts
use several tests to determine the appropriate level of judicial
deference for agency statutory interpretation,186 a central theme of the
Supreme Court’s deference jurisprudence is that agencies are entitled
to their interpretation because they possess superior expertise.187 This
Section will provide an overview of the expertise-based rationale for
judicial deference as a framework for analyzing the FDA’s regulation
of the HIV and DTC genetic testing applications. This Note argues that
although the FDA normally receives deference because of the
scientific nature of its work, courts should not defer to its expansive
interpretation of “safety” for medical devices because it did not use its
scientific expertise when it took regulatory action. Further, the FDA
should not have the relevant expertise and power to evaluate devices
based on consumer reactions to test results because the agency should
not make value judgments about whether consumers are capable of
seeking and dealing with their own medical information.
1. The Expertise-Based Rationale for Judicial Deference. Though
courts use several frameworks to analyze agency interpretations and
actions, the Supreme Court has not given much guidance for
determining the appropriate level of deference given to informal FDA

185. See id. (“Preventing people from accessing genetic tests . . . calls into question the FDA’s
authority to limit the dissemination of information. In order to justify such a limitation, we would
have to strip individuals of their autonomous capacities and challenge the scope of First
Amendment rights to information.”).
186. See generally Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1239–50 (2007) (providing a general overview of
the three major deference tests: Skidmore, Chevron, and Mead).
187. The following section draws heavily from the works of Chaffin and Krotoszynski. See
generally Krotoszynski, supra note 24 (arguing that the expertise rationale for deference has the
strongest justification for judicial deference); Chaffin, supra note 24 (providing an overview of
how agency expertise is central to the Supreme Court’s doctrine on judicial deference to agency
statutory interpretation).
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documents,188 which the agency utilized in its actions regarding HIVtesting kits and DTC genetic testing. At least once, the Supreme Court
has declined to extend Chevron deference to one kind of informal
guidance from the FDA, but there is no clear standard among lower
courts for review of informal guidances generally.189 Although there is
little clarity on this issue, the FDA’s safety determinations can be
evaluated in light of a central theme in the Supreme Court’s deference
jurisprudence: agency expertise is highly valued and crucial to
justifying judicial deference.190
Agency expertise was the Supreme Court’s traditional rationale
for granting deference to agency interpretations.191 In an early
deference case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,192 the Court established a
standard for deference that was premised on a theory of agency
expertise.193 In explaining its rationale, the opinion noted that “the
[agency’s] policies are made in pursuance of official duty, based upon
more specialized experience and broader investigations and
information than is likely to come to a judge in a particular case.”194
Even after Congress created guidance for judicial deference in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),195 two years after Skidmore,
188. K.M. Lewis, Informal Guidance and the FDA, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 507, 533 (2011).
189. In Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009), the Court held that one type of informal
guidance was not entitled to Chevron deference. “[B]ut courts have noted that Wyeth’s rationale”
was probably motivated by other factors unrelated to the policy’s informal status. Lewis, supra
note 188, at 533. Further, the only two appellate decisions regarding the
Christensen/Mead/Barnhart tests, which address the level of deference owed to informal
documents, came to different conclusions as to what level of deference is appropriate for these
documents. Id. at 533–34. Additionally, an analysis of “all federal cases involving both FDA and
the Christensen/Mead/Barnhart” tests found that “[w]hile most district court cases that address
the issue withhold Chevron deference from informal guidance documents issued by FDA, they
do so for starkly different reasons.” Id. at 534. Thus, there is no clear answer as to what level of
deference is appropriate for analyzing informal FDA documents.
190. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
191. Chaffin, supra note 24, at 529.
192. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
193. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 739–40.
194. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139. The Court established a balancing test for reviewing the
agency’s statutory interpretation: granting deference would depend upon “the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.” Id. at 140.
195. The APA was enacted in on June 11, 1946. The Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L.
No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)). Under
section 706(2)(B), courts must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions found to be (1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(B) (2012).
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agency expertise continued to play a central role in deference
determinations.196 One year after the APA’s enactment, the Supreme
Court “reaffirmed expertise . . . as the source of judicial deference to
agency work product.”197 In SEC v. Chenery Corp.,198 the Court
justified upholding an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute
by endorsing an expertise-based rationale.199 Further, the Court
reiterated this justification for deference in FTC v. Cement Institute.200
The majority opinion explained that Congress creates agencies so that
they have the relevant experience and knowledge to interpret and
enforce applicable federal laws.201 These functions then give the
agencies important expertise, which is used in decisionmaking.202
Taken together, these three cases—Skidmore, Chenery, and Cement
Institute—show the central role that expertise plays in the deference
inquiry because “all invoke enhanced agency expertise as the rationale
for affording agency work product deference on judicial review,” even
though the latter two cases were decided immediately after Congress
weighed in on deference standards with the passage of the APA.203
The Court’s deference jurisprudence shifted in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,204 but not as
196. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 740–41.
197. Id. at 740.
198. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
199. The Court noted:
The Commission’s conclusion here rests squarely in that area where administrative
judgments are entitled to the greatest amount of weight by appellate courts. It is the
product of administrative experience, appreciation of the complexities of the problem,
realization of the statutory policies, and responsible treatment of the uncontested facts.
It is the type of judgment which administrative agencies are best equipped to make and
which justifies the use of the administrative process. Whether we agree or disagree with
the result reached, it is allowable judgment which we cannot disturb.
Id. at 209 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945)).
200. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
201. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 741; see id. at 720 (noting that the agency’s “long and
close examination of the questions it here decided has provided it with precisely the experience
that fits it for performance of its statutory duty”).
202. Id. at 741; see Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 720 (noting that, in a previous case, the Court
“called attention to the express intention of Congress to create an agency whose membership
would at all times be experienced, so that its conclusions would be the result of an expertness
coming from experience”).
203. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 741.
204. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Under the
Chevron test, the court first determines whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.” Id. at 842. If Congress’s intent is clear, the agency must follow this expressed
intent. Id. at 842–43. If the court finds that Congress did not “directly address[] the precise
question at issue,” and “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the
court must determine whether the agency’s construction is “based on a permissible construction
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significantly as one might think. Some scholars argue that the Chevron
decision “relocated the basis for judicial deference from expertise to
an implied delegation of lawmaking power.”205 But there is ample
evidence that Chevron did not erase the importance of the expertisebased rationale for deference.206 In a case decided shortly before
Chevron, the Court characterized judicial deference to “[a]n agency’s
construction of its own regulations” as “traditional acquiescence in
administrative expertise.”207 It seems unlikely that the Court would
abandon this deference justification, particularly without a clear
explanation of its decision to do so, only a few years later in Chevron.
Further, the Court in Chevron also explicitly recognized the role that
agency expertise has in conferring deference when it noted that, unlike
agencies, “[j]udges are not experts in the field” and are limited in their
abilities to discern “the incumbent administration’s views of wise
policy” for making judgments.208 Thus, though Chevron certainly
marked a shift in the Court’s justification for judicial deference, this
change did not indicate a complete abandonment of the long
established expertise-based rationale.
The Court’s most recent decisions on judicial deference suggest a
resurgence in the importance of the expertise-based rationale.209 In
United States v. Mead Corporation210 and Barnhart v. Walton,211 the
Court created new formulations for deciding whether the Chevron test
applies to an agency’s interpretation at all.212 In Mead, the Court
considered whether it should defer to an agency’s informal
determination—as opposed to formal processes—under Chevron.213
of the statute.” Id. at 843. Thus, an agency’s interpretation stands unless it is “arbitrary, capricious,
or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Id. at 844.
205. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 742. Under this theory, agencies are entitled to judicial
deference because it is implied that Congress wanted to give them interpretive discretion if the
elements of the Chevron test are met.
206. See Chaffin, supra note 24, at 529 (arguing that “recent judicial precedent suggests that
agency expertise remains a central rationale for judicial deference”).
207. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566 (1980); Chaffin, supra note 25, at
528.
208. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 743.
209. See Chaffin, supra note 24, at 530 (noting that recent precedent suggests “the continued
centrality of agency expertise to judicial deference”).
210. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
211. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
212. Lewis, supra note 188, at 529. This formulation is also known as the “Chevron Step Zero”
analysis. Id.
213. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 221–27 (considering whether a tariff classification by the U.S.
Customs Service, which did not use formal processes, was entitled to judicial deference).
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The Court determined that Chevron analysis did not apply to the
agency’s informal action,214 and its reasoning for doing so supports the
proposition that agency expertise has a crucial role in determining
judicial deference.215 First, the majority opinion referenced Skidmore’s
emphasis on expertise when describing the Court’s understanding and
application of deference.216 Second, the Court “orient[ed] Skidmore
deference as a function of expertise”217 when it held that the agency
might be able to raise a Skidmore claim even though the Court
determined that Chevron did not apply.218
In the follow-up case, Barnhart, the Court reaffirmed and clarified
Mead’s test for whether an agency’s informal decision is entitled to
Chevron deference.219 The Court’s standard in Barnhart also supports
the expertise-based rationale for deference because it included “the
related expertise of the Agency” as a factor for consideration in
applying the Chevron test.220 Thus, the reaffirmation of the expertisebased rationale in Mead also suggests that agency expertise is the
central justification for judicial deference.

214. Here, the U.S. Customs Service issued a tariff classification which did not use formal
processes. Id. at 221–24. The Court determined that this action was “far removed not only from
notice-and-comment process, but from any other circumstances reasonably suggesting that
Congress ever thought of classification rulings as deserving the deference claimed for them”
under Chevron. Id. at 231.
215. See Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 749 (noting that “Justice Souter orient[ed] Skidmore
deference as a function of agency expertise”).
216. “The fair measure of deference to an agency administering its own statute has been
understood to vary with circumstances, and courts have looked to the degree of the agency’s care,
its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and to the persuasiveness of the agency’s
position.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 228 (internal footnotes omitted).
217. Krotoszynski, supra note 24, at 749.
218. Id. The Court explained that “[t]here is room at least to raise a Skidmore claim here,
where the regulatory scheme is highly detailed, and Customs can bring the benefit of specialized
experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case.” Mead, 533 U.S. at 235.
219. See Lewis, supra note 188, at 531 (noting that Barnhart clarified the “unidentified
circumstances” referenced in Mead for instances in which “deference could be warranted in the
absence of procedural formality and force of law” (quoting Cass Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92
VA. L. REV. 187, 216 (2006))).
220. See Chaffin, supra note 24, at 530–31 (noting that “Justice Breyer’s opinion in Barnhart
v. Walton suggests that expertise remains important to the Chevron analysis” because it “appears
to collapse Skidmore and Chevron into a sliding scale”). The test in Barnhart established that
courts should consider “the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long
period of time” to determine whether “Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which
to view the legality of the Agency interpretation.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).
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Although the Court’s major cases regarding judicial deference—
Skidmore, Chevron, Mead, and Barnhart—address different issues
within the process of adjudicating the appropriate level of agency
deference, one justification for deference plays a critical role in all of
these decisions: the expertise-based rationale. Also, this justification is
often used in practice: many courts “emphasize the importance of an
agency’s careful consideration and agency expertise when determining
the amount of deference an agency should receive when interpreting a
complex statutory scheme.”221
Furthermore, courts usually afford scientific agencies “super
deference” based on the scientific nature of their statutory
interpretations.222 The FDA has often enjoyed this “super deference”
because of its status as a scientific agency; it is typically afforded a “high
level of deference” in cases interpreting its scientific or technical
decisions within its realm of expertise.223 For example, the District
Court for the District of Columbia explained in a recent decision
upholding an FDA action224 that when facing an issue framed in terms
of scientific and technological uncertainty, courts “must proceed with
particular caution, avoiding all temptation to direct the agency in a
choice between rational alternatives.”225 In another case, the same
court deferred to the FDA’s decision to approve a drug because the
dispute was “fundamentally a scientific one over which the court
lack[ed] expertise and over which the FDA is the expert.”226 The court

221. Lewis, supra note 188, at 535.
222. This principle came from the Supreme Court’s decision to uphold the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission’s decision about how to treat nuclear waste disposal issues. Meazell,
supra note 25, at 741–42. The Court made it clear that the Commission was entitled to deference
because of its scientific expertise: “[A] reviewing court must remember that the Commission is
making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the frontiers of science. When
examining this kind of scientific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing
court must generally be at its most deferential.” Balt. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
223. Rempfer v. Von Eschenbach, 535 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d, 583 F.3d 860
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
224. In this case, military personnel challenged the FDA’s determination that an Anthrax
vaccine was effective. Id. at 101.
225. Id. at 107 (quoting All. for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (D.D.C.
2000)).
226. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 923 F. Supp. 212, 220 (D.D.C. 1996). In this case a
drug company challenged the FDA’s decision to approve a competitor’s application for a generic
version of their drug. The plaintiff argued in part that the FDA’s process for establishing that the
bioequivalence of the generic drug was incomplete because the agency changed its policy to only
require in vitro testing rather than both in vitro and in vivo testing. Thus, the issue in this case was
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further justified this decision by noting that the FDA “examined the
relevant data and ‘articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action
including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.’”227 Thus, the FDA normally receives this super deference when
it acts within its scientific and technical expertise.
2. The FDA Did Not Use and Should Not Have the Relevant
Expertise To Consider How Consumers Might React to Information
When Determining Whether a Device is Safe. As this Note argues in
Part II, over the past several decades the FDA has relied on its
concerns about consumer reactions to test results to justify its strict
regulation of devices providing personal medical information in the
convenience of one’s own home.228 This Note argues that the courts
should not defer to this interpretation of “safety” under the MDA
because these considerations regarding consumer reactions to test
results do not fall under courts’ typical deference to the FDA’s
scientific expertise. Further, as a policy matter, the FDA should not
have the expertise to make these determinations because they involve
making value judgments about access to personal medical information
that are best left to individuals.
First, the FDA should not be entitled to deference under an
expertise-based rationale because it did not rely on its scientific
expertise when it banned HIV home-testing kits and initially restricted
DTC genetic testing. As noted in the previous Section,229 the FDA
normally enjoys super deference because the agency has a “reputation
for superior science and expertise,”230 which gives the courts
confidence in the FDA’s role as a “gatekeeper” for new drugs and
devices.231 Further, the language of the MDA suggests that scientific
expertise plays a crucial role in determinations about medical devices:
in the provisions that specify the qualifications relevant for members
of device classification panels, areas of scientific expertise are the only
not whether the FDA had conducted any scientific testing, but rather whether its requirements
were sufficiently rigorous. Id. at 214–16.
227. Id. at 219–20 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
228. For a discussion of the FDA’s regulation of HIV home tests and DTC genetic tests based
on consumer protection considerations, see supra Part II.
229. For a discussion of the super deference that the courts usually grant the FDA as a
scientific agency, see supra Part II.B.2.
230. James T. O’Reilly, Losing Deference in the FDA’s Second Century: Judicial Review,
Politics, and a Diminished Legacy of Expertise, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 939, 949 (2008).
231. Id.
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qualifications listed.232 But when the FDA considered taking its initial
actions against HIV home-testing kits and DTC genetic testing
services, it did not use scientific expertise. The FDA did not
demonstrate in its statements or enforcement actions that it relied on
studies or data showing that people would react a certain way;233 rather,
it based its decision on unsubstantiated assumptions about potential
negative reactions from consumers.
When considering whether to ban applications for HIV hometesting kits, the FDA relied on testimony focusing on concerns about
how people would respond to receiving results.234 When the FDA
reconsidered and ultimately overturned the ban, it attempted to cloak
its reasoning in scientific considerations, citing as motivating factors
“scientific and technological developments and the changing nature of
the HIV epidemic.”235 In reality, the scientific community’s
understanding of the importance of diagnostic tools in the fight against
HIV had not wavered during the five-year ban.236 In fact, one company
even applied for approval for testing devices using “essentially the
same data” from studies conducted before the ban.237 This evidence
indicates that the FDA did not utilize its scientific expertise in
considering the safety of the HIV home-testing kits. Rather, it relied
on fears unsupported by scientific data.
Similarly, the FDA also premised its significant restrictions on
DTC genetic testing on overprotective considerations of consumer
safety instead of on scientific findings. Before it sent the Warning
Letter to 23andMe, its recommended restrictions on genetic tests were
based at least in part on concerns about consumer behavior.238 And
when the FDA sent 23andMe the Warning Letter, it notified 23andMe
232. For a discussion of the statutory requirements for device classification panels, see supra
notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
233. For a discussion of the FDA’s reliance on speculation about consumer responses to HIV
and DTC genetic test results for restrictively regulating both types of devices, see supra Parts II.B
and II.C.
234. For a discussion of testimony given on the danger of allowing HIV home-testing at the
FDA’s public forum for its ban on device applications, see supra notes 102–04 and accompanying
text.
235. For a discussion of the FDA’s proffered rationale for overturning the ban, see supra
notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
236. For a discussion of the enduring importance of diagnostic tools to combat the spread of
HIV throughout this time period, see supra notes 117–18 and accompanying text.
237. FDA Blood Prods. Advisory Comm., supra note 120.
238. For a discussion of the FDA Molecular and Clinical Genetics Panel’s early concerns
about consumer reactions to DTC genetic testing results, see supra notes 141–43 and
accompanying text.
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that it was concerned about consumers using the test results as the sole
basis for taking drastic actions, noting that certain genetic test results
could prompt individuals to discontinue medical therapies or undergo
unnecessary treatments.239 Although the FDA has approved some
carrier and disease-risk tests, it forced 23andMe to meet cumbersome
requirements to demonstrate clinical validity during this process.240
Additionally, the FDA seems unwilling to consider approving tests for
important genetic information, such as the BRCA breast cancer genes,
simply because the results could be used for diagnostic purposes.241 The
FDA’s expressed fears about potential negative reactions, swift action
against DTC genetic testing manufacturers, and strict clinical validity
requirements indicate that the agency is acting at least partially on
concerns about whether consumers can effectively weigh the risks and
benefits of seeking this information.
In both cases—the HIV-testing kits and DTC genetic tests—the
FDA based its decisions to restrict consumers’ access to their own
medical information on notions of consumer protectionism rather than
on scientific inquiries into the safety and effectiveness of the devices.
This basis is unlike that used in cases in which courts defer to the FDA’s
judgment. For example, in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala,242 the
District Court for the District of Columbia deferred to a drug approval
decision by the FDA not only because the dispute was “a scientific
one” in which “the FDA is the expert,” but also because the FDA had
“examined the relevant data and ‘articulate[d] a satisfactory
explanation for its action including a rational connection between the
facts found and the choice made.’”243 Although the HIV-testing kit and
DTC genetic testing cases deal with the FDA’s determinations on the
safety of the devices, a court’s rationale for deferring to the FDA’s
decisions should be the same—it should rely on studies and show a
reasonable connection between the data and its conclusions. The FDA
239. For a discussion of the Warning Letter, see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
Although the FDA has a legitimate concern that the tests might give false positive results, it
should be noted that “most (if not all) significant clinical decisions made on behalf of such
information must be made utilizing additional technologies under physician consultation.”
Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10.
240. For a discussion of the requirements that the FDA placed on 23andMe for demonstrating
the analytical and clinical validity of these tests, see supra notes 150, 157–58 and accompanying
text.
241. For a discussion of the FDA’s rationale for effectively banning DTC genetic tests that
could be used for diagnostic purposes, see supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
242. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 923 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1996).
243. Id. at 219–20 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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did not do this data-based or scientific analysis when it banned HIV
home-testing-kit applications or when it placed burdensome
restrictions on DTC genetic testing manufacturers like 23andMe.
Instead, the FDA simply asserted that it had these concerns, suggesting
that its fears over how consumers might use the information
sufficiently justified its actions. Accordingly, courts should not afford
the FDA the deference that it typically enjoys as a scientific agency
because, in these instances, it did not use its scientific expertise when it
considered potential consumer reactions to the information given by
these devices.
Not only did the FDA not use its expertise to make these
determinations, but, as a policy matter, courts should not defer to the
agency’s expansive interpretation of “safety,” even if the FDA used the
relevant expertise and based its restrictions for these devices on
scientific data about consumer reactions. The FDA certainly has the
ability to convene advisory panels to consider the scientific evidence
on the analytical validity of these devices to ensure that they give
accurate results,244 and it can weigh the benefits of a device with the
risks of potential side effects or direct physical harms. However, when
evaluating the safety of a purely informative device, the FDA should
not be permitted to consider the actions that consumers might take
after receiving test results for two reasons.
First, considering how consumers will react to test results
disregards the distinction between “providing information and
providing opportunities to act upon information.”245 The DTC genetic
test has fulfilled its entire purpose once the consumer receives the
result; any action taken by the recipient in response to the information
is “entirely separate from the services directly provided.”246 For
instance, 23andMe’s test results—interpretations of genetic variants—
“relate only indirectly to preventing or diagnosing disease.”247 Using
these interpretations is thus analogous to “inferences drawn about

244. These considerations would certainly constitute ensuring “safety and effectiveness”
under the MDA because one of the motivating factors for passing the statute was giving the FDA
greater authority to take action against ineffective and fraudulent devices. Further, the MDA
provides that device classification panels are comprised of individuals with the relevant scientific
expertise for evaluating the “safety and effectiveness of devices.” For further discussion of the
classification panel, see supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
245. Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10.
246. Id.
247. Green & Farahany, supra note 2, at 286.
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rapid weight loss measured by a bathroom scale.”248 Additionally, most
significant clinical decisions made after receiving genetic test results,
such as a woman getting a mastectomy in response to learning that she
has a high risk of getting breast cancer, require further testing and
physician consultation.249 Accordingly, the FDA should not consider
potential consumer reactions to information when determining
whether a device is “safe” because those considerations are outside the
scope of the device’s purpose.
Second, we should not give the FDA the ability to weigh the costs
and benefits of potential reactions because these considerations
involve value judgments that take effective testing options out of the
hands of consumers. Some might argue that social scientists,
psychologists, and other experts on human behavior could serve on
FDA advisory panels to help the agency make these determinations.
This argument ignores the underlying problem with these
considerations; in making these inquiries, the FDA steps into the shoes
of the consumer and decides whether she can be trusted with weighing
the benefits of learning the results against the potential risks of an
upsetting outcome. Essentially, the FDA is making a paternalistic
value judgment—that it is better to ensure zero negative reactions by
limiting consumer access to this information across the board than to
allow people to make their own choices about whether the tests are
appropriate for them. However, consumers are able to make
assessments about the risks and benefits of pursuing DTC genetic
testing for themselves, especially in light of the abundance of online
resources available regarding genetic testing and gene variants.250
The value judgments based on concerns about consumer reactions
to test results are similar to one of the predominant motivations
underlying the FDA’s early seizure of pregnancy tests—that women
should only get test results in a clinical setting.251 There, the FDA did
not trust women with information about their pregnancy. In the case

248. Id.
249. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (noting that any “significant clinical
decisions made on behalf of [information from test results] must be made utilizing additional
technologies under physician consultation”).
250. For instance, the NIH has created a “Genetics Home Reference,” which “provides
consumer-friendly information about the effects of genetic variation on human health.” Genetics
Home Reference, NIH U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY MED. (2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov
[https://perma.cc/MUN6-4T5R]. This website seems to cover all aspects of genetic testing and is
aimed at public consumption. Id.
251. For a discussion of the FDA’s early hostility towards pregnancy tests, see supra Part II.A.
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of DTC genetic testing, the FDA does not trust consumers with
information about their genetic variants linked to certain diseases or
conditions. After decades of home pregnancy test use, this
overprotective FDA action is almost unimaginable; although some
women might be distraught by their test results, we trust their personal
judgment in seeking this information through home pregnancy tests.
This rationale should apply to all devices that seek solely to provide
personal medical information, such as DTC genetic testing, as long as
the test meets the normal standards for safety and effectiveness.
Ultimately, the FDA’s self-prescribed role as a gatekeeper of
personal medical information significantly interferes with individual
autonomy.252 The FDA’s current restrictive regulation of DTC genetic
testing significantly limits access to genetic information. Before
23andMe received the FDA Warning Letter, it was offering over two
hundred health reports based on genetic test results for ninety-nine
dollars.253 Currently, consumers must go to a medical professional to
access those genetic tests that 23andMe offered, but which the FDA
has still not approved.254 These tests ordinarily cost between one
hundredand two thousand dollars each,255 and also involve other
hurdles, including access issues in nonmetropolitan areas, concerns
about confidentiality of medical records, and genetic discrimination.256
Thus, courts should adjudge the FDA’s value judgment in its efforts to
restrict DTC genetic testing impermissible because it relies on
overprotective notions of consumer safety and severely limits
individuals’ access to their own medical information.

252. See Paternalism vs. Empowerment, supra note 10 (“Preventing people from accessing
genetic tests . . . calls into question the FDA’s authority to limit the dissemination of information.
In order to justify such a limitation, we would have to strip individuals of their autonomous
capacities and challenge the scope of First Amendment rights to information.”).
253. Hof, supra note 1.
254. See Help Me Understand Genetics: How Is Genetic Testing Done?, NIH U.S. NAT’L
LIBRARY MED. 8 (2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/procedure [https://perma.cc/
Z7SF-UCZJ] (explaining that “[o]nce a person decides to proceed with genetic testing, a medical
geneticist, primary care doctor, specialist, or nurse practitioner can order the test”).
255. Help Me Understand Genetics: What Is the Cost of Genetic Testing, and How Long Does
It Take To Get the Results?, NIH U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY MED. 17 (2017), https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/
primer/testing/costresults [https://perma.cc/M8YJ-7TXG].
256. Kathryn Hock et al., Direct-to-Consumer Genetic Testing: An Assessment of Genetic
Counselor’s Knowledge and Beliefs, 13 GENET. MED. 325, 326 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
Over the past several decades, the FDA has successfully restricted
consumers’ access to home-testing applications based on a paternalistic
notion of protecting them from their own potential reactions to test
results. In the 1970s, the FDA wanted to restrict women’s access to
pregnancy tests and keep these devices in the hands of laboratories.
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s, the FDA categorically banned
applications for HIV home-testing technology based on the fear that
consumers could not handle the results without the assistance of a
counselor. And more recently, the agency placed burdensome
restrictions on DTC genetic testing companies because it was
concerned that consumers would make irrational medical decisions
based on genetic variant results. These restrictions illustrate a
disturbing trend with major consequences for current and future
technologies. Ultimately, the FDA’s decision to act as gatekeeper,
limiting consumers’ access to their medical information, is premised on
an impermissible value judgment that significantly restricts individual
autonomy.

